




































A Region in a Mobile World:  










          Mark Metzler 
 
          ________________________________________ 






A Region in a Mobile World:  




Abikal Borah, M. Phil 
Report  
 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of the University of Texas at Austin  
in partial fulfillment of 
the degree of  
Master of Arts   
 





A Region in a Mobile World: Integration of Southeastern sub-Himalayan Region 
into the Global Capitalist Economy (1820-1900) 
By 
Abikal Borah, M.A. 
University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
Supervisor: Mark Metzler 
Abstract:  
This essay considers the history of two commodities, tea in Georgian England and opium 
in imperial China, with the objective of explaining the connected histories in the Eurasian 
landmass. It suggests that an exploration of connected histories in the Eurasian landmass 
can adequately explain the process of integration of southeastern sub-Himalayan region 
into the global capitalist economy. In doing so, it also brings the historiography of so 
called “South Asia” and “East Asia” into a dialogue and opens a way to interrogate the 
narrow historiographical visions produced from area studies lenses. Furthermore, the 
essay revisits a debate in South Asian historiography that was primarily intended to reject 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory. While explaining the historical differences 
of southeastern sub-Himalayan region with peninsular India, Bengal, and northern India, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
From 1986 onwards, historians of South Asia have expressed sharp disagreements 
with Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory.1 David Washbrook is the most notable 
voice in this conversation. Drawing on a wide range of examples from South Asia, 
Washbrook argued that the experiences of this geo-political region do not confirm 
Wallerstein’s universalizing theory of history and the core-periphery model of the global 
capitalist economy. Washbrook problematized Wallerstein’s conceptual model by 
criticizing the interpretation that South Asia is a “semi-periphery” within the world 
system. Washbrook argued that, from the time of its incorporation into the global 
capitalist economy, South Asia possessed “core-like features of manufacture and 
industry, banking and financial management, capital accumulation and bourgeois class 
formation, and strong state organization.” Washbrook also identified periphery-like 
features in South Asia as the region witnessed “highly exploitative and labor-intensive 
economies of mining, planting, peasant farming and landlord rentierism.”2 Elsewhere, 
explaining the English East India Company’s commercial expansion and the growth of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Immanuel Wallerstein conceptualized the world-system theory with a theoretical framework to understand 
the historical changes involved in the rise of the modern world. According to Wallerstein world-system 
refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core 
countries, semi-peripheral countries, and the peripheral countries. Core countries focus on higher 
skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labor-intensive production 
and extraction of raw materials. Wallerstein argued that world system theory offers a comprehensive 
understanding of the external and internal manifestations of the modernization process and offers a room 
for analytical comparisons between different regions of the world. Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical 
Capitalism, (London: Verso, 1983). Also see World System Analysis: An Introduction, (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2004). In 1986, Wallerstein spoke in a conference at Tuft University and 
specifically challenged the South Asianists to respond to his formulation of world system theory. The essay 
was later published in a collected volume. Immanuel Wallerstein, “World-Systems Analysis and Historical 
Particularity: Some Comments” in Sugata Bose ed. South Asia and World Capitalism, (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 21-26.  
2 David Washbrook, “South Asia, World System and World Capitalism”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 49 
(3): (1990), p. 482. 
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military-fiscalism in South Asia, Washbrook argued, “in a certain sense colonialism was 
the logical outcome of South Asia’s own history of capitalistic development.”3 
Simultaneously, a group of eminent historians of South Asia extrapolated 
Washbrook’s discontents with world system theory. David Ludden wrote an influential 
rejoinder by specifically focusing on examples from southern India. Ludden saw the 
scope of Wallerstein’s theory as strictly limited as world system theory “reduces the 
history of world capitalism to chronicles of a capitalist world economy based on 
European imperial expansion.”4 Ludden’s study of rural India’s relationship to world 
economy suggested that, capital transformed production relations in “Village India” 
before 1850 in certain ways that can only be partially explained by European activity. 
Furthermore, explaining the implications of the complex and “over-determined 
interactions among ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forces of change” in late pre-colonial India, 
Ludden argued that the world system theory does not take those into account. 
Furthermore, extending Ludden’s criticism, C. A. Bayly offered a set of complex 
interpretations through an examination of late eighteenth and nineteenth-century north 
India’s political economy. Bayly stressed the importance of the different levels of 
political and economic activities that existed between local specificities within India and 
the generalities of the international capitalist system.5 He also explained the creative and 
dynamic economic activities in the region between 1750 and 1820 to argue that there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 David Washbrook, “Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History”, The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 22 (3): (1988), p. 76. 
4 David Ludden, “World Economy and Village India, 1600-1900”, in Sugata Bose ed. South Asia and 
World Capitalism, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 162-163.  
5 C. A. Bayly, “Indigenous Social Formations and the ‘World System’: North India since c. 1700”, in 
Sugata Bose ed. South Asia and World Capitalism, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 115-116.   
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were certain processes of appropriation by the colonialists as India was integrated into the 
global capitalist economy. 
However, Washbrook, Ludden, and Bayly, in their single-minded pursuit of 
criticizing the world system theory, subscribe to certain assumed historical constructions 
such as the spatial imagination of “South Asia” and “India.” In other words, none of these 
historians felt the need to question the imaginary term “South Asia” by interrogating the 
complex and historically different political economies of different regions that comes 
under the ambit of this geo-political area. These historians contested world system theory 
based on the historical experiences of northern and peninsular India and arrived at broad 
generalizations without considering the diverse history of different other regions of 
“South Asia.” From the beginning of British colonial expansion to the end of colonial 
occupation, the territoriality of British India was in a state of flux. The processes of 
integration of different regions of “South Asia” into the global capitalist economy were 
also distinctly different. The geo-political region that is generally identified through the 
umbrella term “South Asia” shares many historical differences and they deserve careful 
explanation. The term “South Asia,” which came out of the American area studies 
programs, also puts the shared historical relationships between “South” and “East Asia” 
into oblivion. Unfortunately, Washbrook, Ludden, and Bayly do not pay any attention to 
such historical particularities and differences. Instead, they collectively produced a body 
of historiography that does not subscribe to the specific historical experiences of every 
region that is technically a part of “India” and “South Asia.” To put it another way, the 
conversation of the South Asianists with Immanuel Wallerstein obfuscates the fact that 
the present territoriality of India is an imperial formation. Simultaneously, this body of 
4	  
	  
historiography systematically reifies the imaginary term “South Asia.” This essay 
contests such historiographical practices of reifying “South Asia” as an area with shared 
commonalities while trying to answer a straightforward question: Why and how was 
southeastern sub-Himalayan India, or present northeast India, integrated into the global 
capitalist economy?  
Historically, what differentiates southeastern sub-Himalayan region from the rest 
of India was the region’s particularly underdeveloped state of pre-colonial economic 
institutions and financial systems. It is important to recognize that this region was not 
touched by the economic activities of Indian Ocean trade. The trade through the South-
West Silk Road which connected Bengal, Chittagong, Manipur, Burma and Yunnan were 
also insignificant for almost two centuries prior to British colonization of this region.6 
Furthermore, the pre-colonial economy of this region was only partially monetized. For 
instance, till the beginning of the nineteenth century, the pre-colonial Ahom rulers of the 
Brahmaputra valley called as Swargedeos, collected taxes in the form of manual labor 
from their subjects.7 Moreover, prior to British colonization, multiple forms of political 
authority occupied the landmass between the eastern limits of the Ganga and the western 
limits of the Mekong. Apart from the very loosely organized small states, there were 
various monastic guilds in the region organized along sectarian lines. These guilds 
depended on the manual labor of their disciples and managed to accumulate considerable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 James A. Anderson, “China’s South Western Silk Road in World History”, World History Connected, 6 
(1), Web: http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/6.1/anderson.html, extracted on 14 January, 2015.  
7Amalendu Guha, Medieval and Early Colonial Assam: Society, Polity and Economy, (Calcutta: K.P. 
Bagchi & Co., 1991) p. 39-61.  
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wealth.8 Therefore, unlike the Diwani of Bengal, the pre-colonial revenue administration 
of southeastern sub-Himalayan region was not organized under some unitary system. In 
fact, this resulted into serious administrative confusions during the early years of British 
colonization. When the East India Company officials established a fiscal state in the 
Brahmaputra valley and the Barak valley, the region was very thinly populated. This was 
a stark contrast when it comes to the pre-colonial demographic pattern in Bengal and 
northern India. As a result, during the processes of colonization, the East India 
Company’s “political and cultural confrontation, conflict, and compromise” in northeast 
India was of lesser intensity compared to the developments in Bengal and northern India.9  
However, the environmental conditions of southeastern sub-Himalayan region 
were difficult for the smooth functioning of East India Company’s fiscal-state. The 
tributaries of the two major rivers Brahmaputra and Barak crisscrossed its valleys. During 
the monsoon season, recurrent flood in both the valleys often resulted into the 
administrative mismatch between the revenue assessments and the actual turnover.10 
Moreover, when the scheme of colonization first began in the early nineteenth century, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Indrani Chatterjee, Forgotten Friends: Monks, Marriages and Memories of Northeast India, (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 36-40. Also see “Monastic Governmentality, Colonial Misogyny, and 
Postcolonial Amnesia in South Asia”, History of Present: A Journal of Critical History, Vol. 3, No. 1 
(Spring 2013): p. 57-58.  
9I state this in contrast to Sudipta Sen’s observation on the foundation of an Empire of Free Trade in 
Bengal and northern India. In that specific context Sen argues that, “rather than being just a mechanistic 
structure of inevitable economic dominance and subservience between the industrializing core and the 
underdeveloped periphery the results” of East India Company’s “expansion can be seen legitimately in the 
light of political and cultural confrontation, conflict, and compromise that set the context of such economic 
change.” Sudipta Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial 
Marketplace, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 3. C. A. Bayly also covers almost 
the same ground in his meticulous study of north Indian market places. C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and 
Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983)         
10Gunnel Cederlof offers a detailed discussion on administrative speculations and environmental disasters 
during the early phase of colonization in northeast India. Gunnel Cederlof, Founding an Empire on India’s 
North-Eastern Frontier: Climate Commerce and Polity 1790-1840, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2014), p.17-44.   
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this region was densely forested and, there were very few routes for mobility of people 
and exchange of goods. While trying to explain the integration of southeastern sub-
Himalayan India into the global capitalist economy one must recognize these historical 
differences and particularities that determined the mode of colonial expansion in the 
region.  
The recent scholarship on the southeastern sub-Himalayan India has begun to 
question the peculiar spatial geography of the region but the economic historians are yet 
to explain the place of region in the history of global capitalist economy.11 The hitherto 
existing historiography on southeastern sub-Himalayan region tends to remain regionally 
focused and does not adequately explain the global connections of the region.12 Keeping 
this historiographical lack in mind, this paper seeks to locate the history of this region in 
the global history of capitalism. I plan to explain this by looking at the social life of two 
commodities namely opium and tea. I shall explain how a set of related events in the 
early decades of nineteenth century led the way to the founding of a British tea industry 
first in the Brahmaputra valley and, then in the neighboring areas, with capital directly 
invested from metropolitan London. I argue that the growing popularity of tea in 
Georgian England and the increasing consumption of opium in late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century imperial China set the context of integration of northeast India into the 
global capitalist economy. In other words, this essay locates southeastern sub-Himalayan 
India in the triangular trade of opium and tea between India, China, and Britain. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11For discussions on spatial history of southeastern sub-Himalayan region see Sanghamitra Misra, 
Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeast India (New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2011), David Ludden, “Where is Assam? Using Geographical History to Locate Current Social 
Realities,” Sanjib Baruah ed. CENISEAS Papers 1. (Guwahati: Centre for Northeast India South and 
Southeast Asia Studies, OKD Institute of Social Change and Development 2003.) 
12 Examples of regionally focused historiographical practices include Guha (1997, 1991), Saikia (2000), 
Saikia (2011), Kar (2007) and Sharma (2011).  
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explaining that, it brings the histories of “South Asia” and “East Asia” into a dialogue 




Chapter 2: Imperial connections and the social life of tea and opium  
European invasion of Asian market reorganized the regional trade relations within 
Asia both via land and sea. Imperialism introduced novel forms of exchange relations 
within the regional economy of Asia wherein European traders emerged as the 
beneficiaries of the new found economic dynamism. In the nineteenth century colonial 
empires, most notably the British Empire created regional interdependencies in Asia. 
British imperial connections intensified some of the “old relationships” and generated 
“new linkages between the cities (and hinterlands) of Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai as entrepôts and financial centers for Asian 
trade.”13 When it comes to production and exchange of tea and opium, the British 
imperial connections played the most crucial role. Imperial connections determined the 
development of social life of tea in England and opium in China. This section explains 
this development through an exploration of the connected histories in the Eurasian 
landmass. 
 
Tea as a commodity was in use in China since the fifth century but it began its 
social life in Europe only at the turn of the sixteenth century. Tea was first introduced in 
Britain as an exotic drink from the East with high medicinal values. In 1598, a Dutch 
voyager and geographer Jan Huyghen van Linschoten introduced Japanese tea culture in 
English print. In an exaggerated tone Linschoten informed the English readers that 
irrespective of the seasons Japanese drank tea after every meal, and it was a much-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux: Conceptualising a Region for Our Times”, The Journal of Asia Studies, 
Vol,69, (4), p. 964. 
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esteemed drink among the Easterners. 14  Twelve years later, the Dutch East India 
Company brought the first shipment of tea from China and Japan to Amsterdam and 
marketed the commodity across the channel.15 Back then tea was an expensive novelty in 
Britain for those who could afford it. However, by the middle of the seventeenth century, 
tea was introduced in the coffee houses of London and there was a steady increase of tea 
consumption. 
 
In the 1660s, the culture of tea drinking also found royal patronage in England 
through the mediation of the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza who was 
married to Charles II. The development of tea drinking among the elite circles also 
coincided with the euphoria of restoration of the monarchy in 1660 that ended the 
austerity of the Commonwealth. Historian John Burnett observed that different social 
groups associated themselves differently with the burgeoning culture of tea drinking. Tea 
drinking became a part of the “paraphernalia of gentility in the highest circles.”16 At the 
same time, it also appealed to the emerging commercial and professional classes for 
whom it “represented values of sobriety, serious purpose, trustworthiness and 
respectability.” 17  As tea drinking gained popularity and its consumption increased 
significantly, by 1689 British East India Company began to import tea directly from 
China. In 1721, the House of Commons granted the company a monopoly over the tea 
trade to facilitate a steady supply of the commodity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Helen Saberi, Tea: A Global History, (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), p. 86.  
15 Saberi, Tea: A Global History, p.91.  
16 John Burnett, Liquid Pleasures: A Social History of Drinks in Modern Britain, (London: Routledge, 
1999), p.50. 
17 Burnett, Liquid Pleasures, p. 50.  
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By the 1740s, tea became a more affordable beverage for the English working-
class. Between the 1720s and 1740s, the rates of duty on tea were gradually decreased, 
resulting a price fall of the commodity. Furthermore, compared to coffee, the process of 
preparing tea was cheaper. Those who followed the Chinese customary way could drink 
tea in a dilute form without mixing either milk or sugar.18 However, tea mixed with sugar 
became more popular among the English working class as Britain had a steady supply of 
sugar from its Caribbean colonies. In other words, sugar supplemented tea consumption. 
Speaking about the parallel development of sugar and tea consumption John Burnett 
noted the average retail prices of sugar in Britain gradually fell between 1720 and 1740, 
offering a huge relief to working-class consumers of tea.19 In short, by mid eighteenth 
century the social life of tea in Britain became stable across the classes. 
 
However, the supply of tea to the home market was not flowing from Britain’s 
own colonies. The English East India Company’s purchasing power of tea at the Chinese 
base of Canton was dependent on the silver flowing from the New World. Under the 
circumstances, the Company officials diverted their attention towards Indian opium, 
which they planned to exchange for Chinese tea. In 1765, the British East India Company 
acquired the Diwani grants from the Mughal Emperor that offered the Company regime 
the right to collect taxes from the areas of Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. Within a span of 
few years, the Company officials at Fort William, Calcutta put their efforts to take over 
the trade of opium produced in Patna. Subsequently, in 1773, the British colonial 
administration abolished free trade in opium. In other words, production and sale of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 John Burnett, Liquid Pleasures: A Social History of Drinks in Modern Britain, (London: Routledge, 
1999), p.54. 
19 Burnett, Liquid Pleasures, p.55.  
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opium thereafter became solely a concern of the Fort William. In 1797 the Company 
regime modified this system and transformed Bengal opium into a direct state 
monopoly.20 Through the new system they could regulate “the quantity and quality of 
production, stabilized prices at high levels and consistently undercut or assimilated other 
sources of international competition” for the sale of opium in the Chinese market.21 
However, the Company took a cautious stand and decided to let the private traders run 
the risk of supplying the drug and dealing with the possible tensions that could arise at 
the Chinese port of Lintin from where most of the smuggling was conducted.  
 
By the turn of the eighteenth century opium trade between Calcutta and Lintin 
flourished. In the year 1800, approximately 4,000 chests of opium were auctioned at 
Calcutta. By 1808-1809 this figure stood at 4,560 chests and, by 1809-10 it reached a 
high of 5,000 chests.22  This rise in exports of Patna opium to China created an 
opportunity for the other opium producing regions in India. Poppy was extensively grown 
in several parts of western and central India. In fact, from 1770 onward, without the 
cognizance of the British East India Company, the Dutch East India Company was 
conducting a trade in opium between Malwa in western India and Java. In 1820, the 
officials at Calcutta discovered some revealing information on Malwa opium. There were 
significant advantages of Malwa opium over that of the Patna variety because of the 
climatic conditions of the region. Soon the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium in Bengal 
conducted a survey and discovered that Chinese consumers could get 75% of pure extract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of Opium, 
(New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, 1998), p. 12. 
21 J. F. Richards, “The Indian Empire and Peasant Production of Opium in the Nineteenth Century”, 
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (1981), p. 61.    
22Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of Opium, 
(New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, 1998), p. 13. 
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from Malwa opium whereas it stood at 57% for the Patna variety. The moisture present in 
the air often affected the Bengal opium. Moreover, the Malwa opium cakes were small 
and flat which made it convenient for smuggling.23 As these assessments were completed, 
the Company administration put concerted efforts towards monopolizing the opium trade 
in western India as well.  
 
In 1818, following the Third Anglo-Maratha war, the East India Company gained 
territorial control in western India. By then Malwa opium was already well entrenched in 
the market.24 After 1820, the Company regime therefore, concentrated on various Indian-
ruled states in the Gujarat region with the aim of keeping a check on transit of Malwa 
opium. In 1823, the Company administration reconstituted its opium policy. The new 
policy involved arrangements with rulers of opium producing areas of central India and 
Rajasthan, under which the “British government of India was to purchase from these 
states a specified quantity of opium annually at a stated price, and not in a free market 
any longer.”25 At the same time, these states were asked to limit the quantity of 
production in the respective areas so that secret networks of transit could get be 
automatically regulated. Thus, by 1823, the company administration in India completed 
the necessary steps to monopolize the Indian opium trade.  
 
As the smuggled opium from India entered the Chinese market, new forms of 
sociality developed around the commodity. Recent historiography on the culture of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Tan Chung, “The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle (1771-1840)”, The Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, vol. 11, (4), 1974, p. 418.  
24In the season 1817-18, nearly 1828 chests of Malwa opium were exported from the Daman port. Amar 
Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of Opium, (New 
Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, 1998), p. 16.  
25 C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treatises, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring 
Countries, p.19.   
13	  
	  
opium consumption in China has successfully challenged the notion that China was 
adversely affected by the “forceful” introduction of opium. From the eighteenth century 
onwards, the spread of opium in China depended on “the discovery of an entirely novel 
mode of delivery: smoking.”26 The owners of the smoking houses in China began to 
prepare a special blend called madak by mixing opium with tobacco. Of course, madak 
was priced much higher than pure tobacco. Especially, Patna opium became an exotic 
commodity and “an object for connoisseurship” for wealthy scholars and rich merchants. 
Explaining the new consumption habits of opium in the early nineteenth-century China, 
Frank Dikotter, Lars Laamann and Xun Zhou observed that, “opium smoking progressed 
down the social scale”, and “it gradually became a popular marker of male sociality.” 
Moreover, within the households, opium emerged as a “vector of hospitality and the 
‘welcome smoke’ (yingchou) offered to guests,” which with time “became an 
indispensable aspect of social etiquette with failure to offer opium considered a serious 
faux pas.”27 Furthermore, opium marked its presence also among the underprivileged 
classes of Chinese society. Smoking was considered as a collective experience and an 
occasion for social intercourse.  
 
As the social life of tea in Britain and, opium in China was well settled by the 
early decades of nineteenth century, the English East India Company made 
unprecedented financial gains. However, there were many stakeholders in the India-
China opium trade. Britain’s trade with India and China was conducted through the small 
private agency houses that began to flourish in the first three decades of the nineteenth 
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27 Dikotter, Laamann and Zhou, “China, British Imperialism and the Myth of the Opium Plague”, p.25.  
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century. The so called Agency Houses were primarily trading houses who also acted as 
bankers, bill brokers, ship owners, freighters, insurance agents and purveyors. They 
maintained close financial and commercial connections with their branches across 
geographically distant locations. Unlike the East India Company, they were not joint-
stock companies but they were the means of establishing partnerships among individuals 
that could continue to remain functional even if their partners died. Michael Greenberg 
observed that an agency house was a “many sided edifice. It was a structure well able to 
adapt itself to every line of growth, every avenue of remuneration which the China trade 
offered; and yet capable of bearing the stress of that extreme tension which the ‘opening’ 
of China was to involve.”28 The agency houses took great advantage of this system, and 
partnerships like Reid Beale & Co., Remington Crawford & Co., Jardine Matheson & Co. 
etc. gradually became powerful enough in Asian trade to work against the interests of the 
English East India Company.  
In the 1820s, the private merchants were becoming increasingly influential at 
Canton base causing threats to the monopoly of the English East India Company. During 
the initial years of Britain’s China trade, the private trading firms and the East India 
Company were able to coexist as their trade moved in different spheres. However, the 
rapid growth of country trade in the partnership between the independent traders and the 
Chinese Hong merchants disrupted the balance and produced a divergence of interest. As 
the competition between the East India Company and the private merchants escalated at 
Canton, reactions began to emerge from the British manufacturers as well. The private 
merchants incessantly lobbied against the Company’s monopoly. From 1829 onward, the 
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campaign against the East India Company’s monopoly began in earnest as the British 
manufactures from Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, Bristol, Birmingham and Leeds 
collectively demanded the parliament to open the China trade for sale of all kinds of 
goods. They also emphasized on the need to lower the prices of tea for British consumers, 
which they suggested, couldn’t be achieved until and unless East India Company’s 
monopoly was not terminated.29 This struggle between British manufactures and the 
English East India Company continued throughout 1831-32, and finally, in 1833, the 
Company’s monopoly in eastern trade came to an end. But by then the East India 
Company regime in India had made considerable advance in expanding its frontier 
further east from Bengal. The imperial gaze beyond the eastern limits of the Ganga was at 
the heart of the company’s interest in the Chinese markets.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842, p. 184. 
16	  
	  
Chapter 3: The land beyond Bengal and the imperial gaze  
The landmass beyond the eastern limits of the Ganga, one that connects Bengal to 
Burma and China, is presently called as northeast India. Keeping the Himalayas as a 
reference point this area can also be called as southeastern sub-Himalayan region. To put  
 
Map 1: Present map of Northeast India. Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The 
Australian National University. 
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it in the area studies vocabulary, northeast India is the crossroad between so called 
“South Asia” and “Southeast Asia.” However, the term northeast India is a contingent 
signifier commonly used to suit the statist vocabulary of the present Indian nation-state. 
In the British colonial archive, northeast India was often identified as Assam. At the same 
time, the word Assam appears under different labels in modern cartographic practices 
with respect to time. The present northeast India is constituted of eight different states of 
Indian nation state, namely, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Tripura, and Mizoram. This region presently shares international borders with 
Nepal, Bhutan, China, Burma, and Bangladesh. Interestingly, northeast India shares its 
borders mostly with other nation-states rather than with India. Discussing the peculiar 
spatiality of the region amidst many nation-states, recent scholarship has pointed out, 
“…how we might locate social realities in multiple, changing, and mobile spaces that 
Impart to territories like Assam in kaleidoscopic appearance, open to many disparate 
interpretations and analytical approaches, in the fullness of time, that is, in the fulsome 
context of history in the short term, long term, ancient past, immediate present, and 
currently unfolding future.”30 In other words, present northeast India is a referent to 
narratives of changing political regimes, territorial reconfigurations, and making and 
unmaking of modern nation-states.  
During the pre-colonial times, present northeast India was not integrated into the 
Mughal administrative structures. In the early decades of nineteenth century, when the 
English East Company began its colonization scheme in this region, the policies of the 
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Company regime at Calcutta lacked clarity. However, the Company administration had a 
fairly good sense of the region’s connected geography. They were also interested in the 
possibilities of navigation in the region. An early account, commissioned by the 
Company office at Calcutta, described Assam’s geography and demography as follows:  
Assam is that extensive tract of country on either side of the Brahmaputra; stretching 
on the N. shore from the river Monash (sic) opposite Goalpara, and on the S. from 
Nughurbera hill, about 16 miles above Goalpara, to the foot of the Himalayan 
mountains (sic) close upon the western boundary of China. On the N. it is bounded 
by a cold mountainous country inhabited by Booteas, Akas, Duphlas, Koppachors, 
Miris, Abors, and Mishmis; the first being most westward, and others eastward in 
succession; Kangtis, Bor-Kantis, Singphos and Muamarias, separate it on the 
extreme east from China and Burma; the Munniporis, Nagas, Mikirs, Cacharis, 
Kassyas and Garrows from our possessions in Sylhet on the south; while it is 
connected on the west with Bengal, by the Zillah Goalpara, late N. E. Rungpore. 
Though geographically speaking, Assam terminates at the river Monash, yet the 
same peculiar country borders the Brahmaputra as far as Jumalpore: has (sic) the 
same climate, and the same change of seasons. Assam may properly be called the 
valley of the Brahmaputra, navigable branches intersect it in every possible 
direction, and there is perhaps not a spot of habituated (sic) ground so situated, as to 
be more than a convenient distance from some navigable stream.31 
        
In other words, before colonization there was no clear marker of state boundaries in 
the region. The boundaries were defined based on the natural geography of the area. This 
early colonial gaze on Assam reflects on two distinct concerns of the Company regime. 
Firstly, this narrative explained the geographical connection that Assam shares with 
Bengal and China. In other words, it showed the connections of Bengal with China and 
Burma via land. Secondly, the narrative suggestively pointed out the potential navigable 
channels. After all, navigation was an important concern for trade.  
 
However, this account offered an oversimplified view of the river system in the 
region that needs to be explained in greater details. Two major rivers flow through 
northeast India. The Brahmaputra, which flows southwest through Assam, originates in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Map 2: Map of Burma (1827). Source: Perry-Castañeda Library map collection, University of 
Texas at Austin.  
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the Angsi Glacier in Tibet. In Tibet, the river is called as the Yarlung Tsangpo. Yarlung 
Tsangpo flows through southern Tibet, and veers abruptly before entering northeast 
India. In northeast India, the river is called as the Brahmaputra. Finally, the Brahmaputra 
enters into eastern Bengal or present day Bangladesh, where is it called as Jamuna. The 
Brahmaputra in Assam has over two dozen tributaries that flow through both the northern 
and the southern bank of the river valley. Barak, the other major river of the region, 
originates in the Manipur Hills. The river flows southwest through Manipur and enters 
Mizoram. Then it veers abruptly northward and enters southern part of Assam before 
flowing into eastern part of Bengal. The principal tributaries of Barak are: Jiri, 
Dhaleswari, Singla, Longai, Sonai and Katakhal. Furthermore, Chindwin, a tributary of 
Irrawaddy River flows through Manipur before entering Bengal. In other words, the 
tributaries of the Brahmaputra, Barak, and Irrawaddy separate the landmass of 
southeastern sub-Himalayan region. Besides the river valleys, a hilly region, which is an 
easterly continuation of the Himalayas, separates the Brahmaputra valley from the 
Irrawaddy valley in Burma. During the monsoon season, the percentage of rainfall in this 
region is very high. The early colonial reports very often suggested that excessive rainfall 
led to annual floods in the region causing damage to property and life. 
 
Furthermore, during the early years of colonization, northeast India was thickly 
forested and the population density of the region was very low. In the colonial gaze, the 
first impression of the region was that, “The appearance of the country is very different 
from that of most others in India.”32 From 1790 onward, the East India Company made 
efforts to march further east from the Bengal plains. Gunnel Cederlof observed that the 
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Company officials viewed nature in this region in two different ways: nature as an 
unpredictable threat which was destructive and, nature as viewed by the surveys: areas 
for possible “entrepreneurship and commerce.”33 Discussing the forests and the wildlife 
of the region, an officer serving in the Bengal Native Infantry described the region as a 
territory consisted of “jungle, woods, and hills, which are tenanted by few human 
beings.” It further suggested that the region was “overrun by elephants, buffaloes, 
rhinoceroses, tigers, wild boars, and deer, or infested with crocodiles and boa-
constrictors, and other colossal denizens–quadruped and reptilian–of an intertropical (sic) 
luxuriance of marsh and forest,” and these areas were “scarcely inhabitable.”34 Such 
mode of narration was very common in almost all early colonial accounts. Even if one 
ignores the perverse gaze of the colonial officials, these reports confirm that the region 
was indeed thickly forested. The reports also suggested that the mountainous area of the 
region, the “forest clad hills and rocks,” were “equally difficult to access,” and “like the 
plains”, very “thinly peopled.”35 To put it differently, when the East India Company 
decided to expand its territory further east of Bengal, they entered a thinly populated, 
thickly forested terrain of hills and river valleys; a terrain which was quite different from 
Bengal and northern India and it was difficult to navigate.  
Moreover, recent scholarship on northeast India has shown us the colonial 
administrators lacked knowledge on the pre-colonial social and political authorities in 
northeast India. The Company officials were aware of the Ahom rulers of the 
Brahmaputra valley, and their assumption was that the Ahom king, called as the 
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Swargadeo, was the dominant political authority of the region. However, the overlapping 
nature of political and social authorities of the region was little known to the colonial 
officials at Fort William. Ironically, such false perception later got transposed into the 
nationalist historiography of the twentieth century as well. Disrupting the comfort of 
colonial and nationalist historiography, Indrani Chatterjee has shown us that, between the 
second and the eighteenth centuries, “a form of political society located in the household” 
gradually developed and strengthened in this region. These societies were basically 
monastic guilds constituted of “an eminent or skilled teacher and his coresidential 
disciple or student.”36 Chatterjee called those as “monastic governments,” and argued 
that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they “anchored discrete but intertwined 
geographies—one cosmological and the other territorial, political and socioeconomic.”37 
Through a careful act of excavation, Chatterjee wove an alternative narrative of 
circulation of wealth in these networks with specific focus on the household economy. 
However, the religious traditions and ritual practices of these monastic lineages were 
different from one another. Furthermore, the monastic heads could also influence the 
armed military authorities of the region. For instance, in 1769, due to the vested interests 
of the different monastic teachers in the political authorities of the region, an intra-
sectarian war occurred in the Brahmaputra valley. This war sporadically continued for 
more than three decades, and it is now known as the Moamoria Rebellion.  
The context of the Moamoria Rebellion figures prominently in the colonial records 
but it appears only as a rebellion led by the followers of Moamoria monastic order 
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against the ruling Ahom Swargadeo. During this intra-sectarian war, the tributary 
chieftains under the Ahom Swargadeo had declared independence, and it disrupted 
cultivation and trade in the area between Bengmara and Guwahati. The rebels also 
attacked the royal palace at Gargaon. The Ahom Swargadeo left Gargaon and took shelter 
at Guwahati, in western Assam. Under these circumstances, in 1792, Captain Thomas 
Welsh of the Bengal Native Infantry led the first British military expedition in the 
Brahmaputra valley, which the officials at Fort William justified as an effort to reinstate 
the power of the Ahom Swargadeo in the valley. 
 
 
Map 3: “Ahom Kingdom-1826,” Mohammad Taher, in “Assam: An Introduction”, in A.K. 




However, Welsh did not have any idea about the complex political realities on the 
ground. In the space between the Brahmaputra valley and the neighboring region of 
northern Burma, there were concurrent sovereign powers, which were competing for 
control of the area. The contemporary economic and political developments in Burma 
had a direct impact in the Brahmaputra valley and Manipur. Explaining the contestation 
among different political powers in the region, Bodhisattva Kar argued that, what 
appeared to “the Europeans as “a confused sea of forest-clad hills and narrow valleys” 
now and then intercepted with river streams, was dotted with numerous state and non-
state spaces with fluctuating boundaries and reversible destinies.”38 Very often, economic 
reasons were at the center of such political contestations. Both the Brahmaputra valley 
and the Irrawaddy valley were suitable for wet-rice cultivation. As the local population 
depended on wet rice cultivation, the demographic patterns as well as shifts in the region 
were caused by people’s quest for cultivable land. In the late eighteen and early 
nineteenth century, the Burmese intermittently made efforts to expand their agrarian 
frontier by aggressively marching towards Manipur and the Brahmaputra valley. 
Bodhisattva Kar explained this in the following manner:   
Located in the fertile rice-growing basin of Kyaukse, Ava emerged as the strongest 
political alternative to Pegu after the seventeenth-century commercial crisis in the 
coastal trade circuit. From the middle of the eighteenth century, its command of the 
dwindling agricultural core of the dry zone was reinforced by the valuable control of 
the Mu River irrigation system, focused at Shwebo. The Konbaungs who brought 
about the valley-wide integration of the Irrawaddy after overthrowing the Toungoos 
at Ava in 1752 were insistent on pushing the frontiers of state space beyond the 
immediate valley complex. As Mon resistance and shrunken commerce restricted the 
Burman expansion in the delta area in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Ava 
eyed the neighboring wet-rice producing formations stretching across from the 
Mekong through the Brahmaputra (collectively known as the Shan states to the 
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British), the long and narrow littoral beyond the Yoma range (shown as Arakan on 
the European maps).39 
  
In the second half of the eighteenth century, Manipur faced some adverse 
consequences of these developments at Ava. The armies from Ava repeatedly invaded the 
Kangla domain between 1753 and 1764, and “succeeded in carrying off an unusually 
large number of skilled inhabitants to resettle them as hereditary crown servants at Ava, 
apart from snatching much of the available wealth on the way.”40 Thereafter, forces from 
Ava routinely invaded Manipur. In 1782, the area ruled by Maharaja Bhagyachandra of 
Manipur was eventually forced to become a feudatory of Ava. Similar invasions of Ava 
into the areas of Cacher and the Brahmaputra valley acquired momentum in the second 
decade of the nineteenth century. In 1817, the Ava army invaded Cacher and Heramba 
causing tension to the British officials. The matters became worse in 1822, when six 
British subjects were taken as hostage by the Burmese.  
While such aggressive military expeditions continued under the directions of the 
court of Ava at Cacher, there emerged an internal political conflict within the Ahom 
court. In 1811, Chandrakanta Singha became the new Ahom Swargadeo. However, his 
ascendency to the throne was not acceptable to all. By 1817, Purandar Singha, a powerful 
minister within the Ahom court, conspired against Chandrakanta Singha to dethrone the 
Swargadeo. A group of ministers under the leadership of Badanchandra Barphukan also 
supported Purandar Singha. But this plot was soon discovered. The Ahom Swargadeo 
Chandrakanta Singha ordered the arrest of Barphukan. But, Barphukan escaped to 
Guwahati and then, reached Ava travelling via Calcutta to seek help from the Burmese 
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king Bodawpaya. The Burmese army took advantage of the situation and, crossed over 
the Patkai range to enter the erstwhile Brahmaputra valley. Describing this invasion 
Bodhisattva Kar observed that it did not “take much time for the disgruntled local elites 
of the Brahmaputra Valley to realize how helpless they were in terms of technology and 
manpower against the vast war machine of Ava.”41 Thereafter, the only possible source 
of patronage that the Ahom lords could seek was the British in Calcutta. Purandar Singha 
was cunning enough to take advantage of this situation. His ultimate ambition was to gain 
control of the Brahmaputra valley with the help of the British. In September 1819, he 
petitioned the Governor General at Calcutta seeking for intervention. In other words, 
Purandar Singha offered the Company regime at Calcutta an opportunity for which they 
were eagerly waiting for. Soon, the Bengal Native Infantry joined Purandar Singh’s 
army. In May 1820, Purandar Singha defeated Chandrakant’s forces at Bijni. By the end 
of 1821, Purandar Singh’s army appeared triumphant over the invading army of Ava.  
But, by the summer of 1822, a strong reinforcement of 20,000 men arrived from 
Ava. The Burmese army, led by Mengee Maha Bandula, established their base at 
Rangpur and occupied the Brahmaputra valley once again. After this defeat, Purandar 
Singha sought refuge at Calcutta. Soon, Mengee Maha Bandula sent a strong message to 
Calcutta stating that the war would continue until and unless the fugitive Ahom 
Swargadeo Purandar Singha was not handed over to the Burmese army. This message 
created a sense of concern among the East India Company officials at Calcutta. They 
launched a military offense and the first Anglo-Burmese War began by early 1824. The 
Ava troops lost heavily in the two years long war. In February 1826, the English East 
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India Company forced the court of Ava to sign a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo whose 
articles stated that:  
His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims upon, and will abstain from all 
future in interference with, the Principality of Assam and its Dependencies, and also 
with the contiguous petty States of Cachar and Jyntia...To prevent all future disputes 
respecting the Boundary Line between the two great nations, the British Government 
will, retain the conquered Provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of 
Arracan, Ramee, Cheduba, and Sandowey, and His Majesty the King of Ava Cedes 
all rights thereto.42 
 
 
However, the East India Company lacked preparations to directly administer the 
Brahmaputra valley. The Company regime therefore, decided to reinstate Purandar 
Singha as a tributary king of upper Assam for a period of ten years. The conditions for 
the last Ahom Swargadeo were tough as he was bound to deposit a tax of Rs. 50,000 to 
retain his throne. However, the East India Company appointed David Scott as the 
Commissioner of lower Assam. Initially, the Company regime intended to design its land 
revenue policies in Assam along the lines of Bengal. In Bengal, since 1793, the Company 
conducted the land revenue administration through the system of Permanent Settlement. 
The central premise of this “quasi-feudal” land settlement was to recognize property as 
the basic principle of government.43 The Permanent Settlement was primarily a contract 
between the East India Company and the local Zamindars, the pre-colonial landholding 
class of Bengal. To ensure a steady flow of revenue, the Company regime adopted this 
policy wherein they utilized the traditional position of the Zamindars to run their new 
revenue administration. Subsequently, the codes of Permanent Settlement in Bengal not 
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only framed the East India Company’s relationship with land as a productive resource for 
revenue generation but it also laid out the foundation of their future administrative vision. 
As the Company put concerted efforts towards transforming the population in the 
Brahmaputra into fiscal subjects, David Scott was to perform the task of completing the 
land revenue assessments. 
 
However, in an area like the Brahmaputra valley, a continuation of the Permanent 
Settlement was not possible. Unlike the Diwani of Bengal, there was no pre-existing 
unitary land revenue system in this region. For instance, in the areas ruled by the Ahom 
rulers, they followed the pyke system. Every single able-bodied male was considered as a 
pyke. Every year, for a period of three months, a pyke contributed his labor power in the 
service of the royal household. This was considered as his annual tax. However, a pyke 
could pay his taxes in another way. They could also serve in a monastery, for equal 
amount of time, as the monasteries had an alliance with the royal household. Apart from 
contributing three months of labor, a pyke was not liable to pay any tax for the land that 
he possessed for wet-rice cultivation.44 In other words, two different forms of political 
authorities in the same area conducted the taxation regime in the Ahom ruled areas of the 
Brahmaputra valley. Due to such overlapping structures in the region, the East India 
Company struggled to identify a specific landholding class with whom the new regime 
could form an alliance. 
Moreover, during the early years of colonization, the entire Northeast India was a 
thinly populated and densely forested region. The Company officials were literally 
dealing with a semi-submerged landscape because of the complex river system and the 
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monsoon floods. At the same time, the complexity of the landscape was forged with the 
complicated web of networks and hierarchies that controlled the region. Discussing this 
process in the 1820s, Gunnel Cederlof has shown us that the Company regime confronted 
old conflicts over rivers, foothills, and market places as they acquired new territories. To 
resolve such conflicts the Company officials tried to create clearer territorial markers for 
themselves and engaged with other powers like the rulers of Manipur and Tripura. While 
settling territorial disputes, the officials tended to choose natural markers as boundaries. 
For instance, they dealt with the conflict between the rulers of Cachar and Tripura at 
Hailakandi on the banks of Dhalesawri River by demarcating the east-west division along 
the river. Gunnel Cederlof observed that, for the British, rivers “constituted an easily 
defended outer border, separating people by a line cutting through the landscape by 
which order could be upheld.”45 In other words, early colonial policies in northeast India 
were highly contingent, and the processes of establishing administrative control in the 
region were quite arbitrary. 
Furthermore, during the early years of colonization, the Company officials’ lack of 
familiarity with the difficult environmental conditions on the ground produced major 
upsets in the revenue administration. Natural calamities often disrupted the bureaucratic 
efforts towards regulating the land revenue system. Very often, “The Fiscal mechanism, 
the perpetual settlement, and a more general perception of large scale classification and 
essentialism immediately ran into a serious trouble from the fluid, shifting, non-
equilibrial dynamics of the wet-land, river, grassland, and forest ecologies.”46 As a result, 
the revenue speculations never matched with the real turnover. For instance, in places 
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like Cacher, in spite of constant encouragements from the colonial administration, the 
local population failed to clear thick dense forests to practice settled cultivation. On top 
of that, unpredictable natural calamities such as monsoon floods intermittently upset 
planning and efforts.  
However, the East India Company’s policy to look eastward of Bengal was not 
solely guided by the objective of land acquisition and revenue generation. The Company 
regime was also putting its efforts towards connecting the Brahmaputra valley with 
Yunnan. In the 1820s, the imperial gaze was on the Chinese markets as the commercial 
value of those was already known in the official circles of the Company. Since the early 
days of the East India Company’s trade with China, the 30 million people of Yunnan and 
Szechuan province used to send their goods via trade routes that were 1,200 to 1,500 
miles long. Tea produced in Yunnan and Szechuan province could reach Canton after 
being transported through such long routes. On the other hand, the distance between 
Yunnan and Bhamo, a town on the bank of Irrawaddy River in Burma, was only 230 
miles.47 In other words, Yunnan, if connected through Bahmo via land, could have been 
geographically closer to the newly acquired British territories in the Brahmaputra valley. 
Even though the exact geographical details of these places were not known within the 
official circles of the English East India Company till 1868, the Company regime could at 
least imagine the tremendous commercial prospects of reopening the South-West Silk 
Road. The South-West Silk Road was mainly divided in three overland routes that 
connected Yunnan, upper Burma, Manipur, Chittagong, and Bengal. Gunnel Cederlof 
suggested that these routes held key roles in the East India Company’s vision of 
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northeastern frontier in the early nineteenth century. The northern South-West Silk Road 
“entered Burma via the Taping River at Bhamo on the Irrawaddy and proceeded 
northwards via the market town of Mogoung to enter Upper Assam at the Patkoi Pass.”48 
As the East India Company expanded its territory towards northeast India along the 
Brahmaputra and Barak valley, they “sought to gain control of the nodal points in the old 
commercial networks.”49 Certainly, to reopen this trade route was an important concern 
of the Company regime as it could establish their control on overland commercial flows 
from the Chinese markets. Writing in 1837, John M’Cosh, an assistant surgeon in the 
service of the East India Company, described the situation to his superiors at Calcutta in 
the following way:  
There is an open road from Upper Assam into Burma, and thence into China, by 
which a considerable trade in Chinese and Burmese manufacturers is carried on. 
Indeed the Burmese in their invasions of Assam generally entered it by this route. 
The line of trade after leaving Suddia passes by Bisa across the Patkoye range of 
mountains and through the valley of Hoo-koong, to the town of Moon-koong, 
situated on a navigable branch of the Irrawaddi called Namyang. Merchants 
proceeding from Moon-koong to Ava at once descend the Irrawaddi to the capital; 
while those to China ascend the Irrawaddi for many miles, to a place called Cat-
mow, where they disembark their goods and thence convey them on mules over a 
range of mountainous country inhabited by Shans (subject to Ava) into the Chinese 
province of Yunan (sic).50        
  
As M’Cosh explained this trade route, he also envisioned a plan for commercial activities 
in this region.  
Considering the small extent of land that intervenes the navigable branches of the 
Brahmaputra, and the sources of the great rivers of Ava, of Martaban, of Cambodia, 
and of Nankin, an overland communication by means of a good road would be 
mutually beneficial to the three great nations whose territories there meet; and would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Gunnel Cederlof, Founding an Empire on India’s North-Eastern Frontier: Climate Commerce and Polity 
1790-1840, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 84.  
49Cederlof, Founding an Empire on India’s North-Eastern Frontier, p. 86-87.  
50 John M’Cosh, Topography of Assam, (Calcutta: Bengal Military Orphan Press, 1837), p. 11.  
32	  
	  
open a direct inlet for the importation of all the valuable productions of Northern 
Central Asia.51   
   
In other words, M’Cosh pronounced the visions of ‘free trade’ and, linked the spirit of 
that vision to the connected geography between southeastern sub-Himalayan India, 
Burma, and China. In other words, his vision was connected the rationale of imperial 
expansion and the logic of “free trade” to one another. However, this vision was a distant 
dream as the East India Company, after losing its monopoly over Asian trade, was in no 
position to materialize it. But, by this time, the Company administration made an 
important discovery in eastern Assam. They discovered that the tea bush was indigenous 
to this region. Thereafter, the process of integrating northeast India into the global 
capitalist economy took a completely different turn. While founding the tea industry in 
Assam, the Company officials and the free traders made the best use of the connected 
geography between northeast India and China.      
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Chapter 4: Founding the tea industry in the Brahmaputra Valley  
In the early nineteenth century, as the East India Company was making an effort 
towards its territorial expansion in northeast India, a good number of European free 
traders also became active in the region. While some of them were trying to establish 
trade relations with lower Burma, others sought their fortune in the Brahmaputra valley. 
In the early 1820s, Robert Bruce, a former army official turned businessman, was 
searching for his fortune in eastern Assam with the hope of establishing some contact 
with Yunnan via land. By 1823, Bruce managed to establish contacts with the Singpho 
chief Beesa Gaum near Sadiya in eastern Assam. Interestingly, the Singhos used to grow 
the tea bush and they were regular users of the commodity. The Singhos introduced 
Bruce to their indigenous method of preparing tea. In fact, their method of preparation 
was quite different from the Chinese. Singphos used to “pluck the tender leaves, and dry 
them a little in the sun; some put them out in the dew, and then again in the sun” for 
“three successive days.” The other method of preparing tea among the Singhos was to put 
the leaves on a hot pan, “turn them about until quite hot, and place them into the hollow 
of a bamboo over the fire until it is full; then tie the end up with leaves, and hang the 
bamboo up in some smoky place in the hut.”52 This helped them to preserve the tea leafs 
for regular use throughout the year. They used to soak the dry leaves in hot water to 
prepare the drink. For Robert Bruce, this was not only a new discovery but also a golden 
opportunity. Soon, Bruce travelled to Yunnan, procured a few Chinese laborers, and got 
actively involved in developing an experimental tea plantation at Sadiya.53 After the first 
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Anglo-Burmese war, in accordance with the Treaty of Yandaboo, Sadiya officially 
became a part of the East India Company’s territory. During this time, Charles Alexander 
Bruce, who happened to be a brother of Robert Bruce, was in the service of the 
Company’s army. Incidentally, C. A. Bruce was appointed at Sadiya. C. A. Bruce’s 
appointment offered a good support to Robert’s plan. Subsequently, the Bruce brothers 
earnestly got involved into developing the experimental tea plantations.            
However, during the first ten years of this experiment, the Bruce brothers did not 
inform any senior official of the East India Company about the developments at Sadiya. 
It was only in 1833, C. A. Bruce verbally informed Captain Francis Jenkins, the 
commissioner of lower Assam, about their experimental plantation.54 But, back then 
Jenkins did not pay any attention to Bruce’s information as the news of abolition of the 
East India Company’s monopoly over China trade was yet to arrive in the eastern 
borderland of British India. Once the news of abolition arrived, the outlook of the 
Company officials changed dramatically. In 1834, William Bentinck, the Governor 
General of India speculatively informed the London office about the prospects of tea 
cultivation in India. Bentinck was quite uncertain about an exact location where the tea 
plantation could take off. He was also not very convinced by the reports presented to him 
by Nathaniel Wallich, the official botanist and the architect of Calcutta Botanical Garden. 
Wallich had tentatively informed Bentinck that in the foothills of the Himalaya there 
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should be a suitable location for the initial experiment. Based on Wallich’s report, 
Bentinck made a wild guess, and suggested that there must be some congenial climate 
and soil “between Himalayas and Cape Comorin” for cultivation of tea. He further wrote, 
“it may be practicable to have from China cuttings of the true and the best descriptions of 
the plant, and knowledge and skill for its cultivation, and for the subsequent process of 
preparing the leaves for use.”55 As obvious, Bentinck was yet to grow out of the 
dependency syndrome on China tea. Thus, with a desire to undergo an apprenticeship 
under the Chinese, Bentinck suggested that, “an intelligent agent should be selected, who 
should go down to Penang and Singapore, and in conjunction with the authorities there, 
and most intelligent of the Chinese agents, should concert measures for obtaining the 
genuine plant.”56 For the East India Company officials in India, this was indeed a 
desperate moment. After all, abolition of the monopoly over China trade could potentially 
disrupt their triangular trade of opium and tea between India, China, and Britain. 
Financially, it was a huge threat to the Company’s interests. Bentinck’s report was just a 
representation on those concerns.   
While ignorant Bentinck was still making arbitrary plans, the Tea Committee 
submitted its report on 15th of March 1834. The East Indian Company appointed the Tea 
Committee to conduct a survey of geological and climatic conditions across India for tea 
cultivation. The committee was constituted of a set of amateur botanists, geologists, and a 
few individuals from colonial administration, mostly handpicked from Calcutta. Tea 
Committee’s initial surveys suggested that the lower hills and the valleys of the 
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Himalayan range would be a suitable site for tea cultivation. It further said that, “next to 
them, those of our eastern frontier offer the best prospects, and after them the Nilgherry 
and other lofty mountains in southern and central India.”57 The committee members were 
also informed about the discovery of several species of Camellia in the mountainous 
tracts of the northern and eastern frontier of British India. But, the most of the 
information that they received were more speculative then real. So the committee took a 
cautious stand and recommended that more information should be collected from China. 
However, they were hopeful about building a network with China. They suggested that:  
We are informed, that for the last three or four years, vessels have been constantly 
employed by some of the English merchants in trading to the eastern and northern 
part of China...The Dutch succeeded in procuring several hundred Chinese, and 
abundance of plants and seed, for their experimental tea plantations at Java; and 
there are now several Europeans at Canton who have attained such proficiency in the 
language, that there would be no difficulty in explaining to intelligent natives the 
nature of the information, and the description of the people required.58    
             
In other words, a speculative plan for the experiment was charted out. Following this 
plan, in June 1834, the secretary of the Tea Committee G.J. Gordon sailed from Calcutta 
to gather information about tea cultivation and manufacturing. While Gordon was still 
away, in the month of December, the Tea Committee produced another report. This time, 
with all certitude, the committee confirmed that:  
...the tea shrub is beyond all doubt indigenous to upper Assam, being found here 
through an extent of country of one month’s march within the Honourable 
Company’s territories, from Suddya and Beesa, to the Chinese frontier province of 
Yunnan, where the shrub is cultivated for the sake of its leaf. We have no hesitation 
in declaring this discovery which is due to the indefatigable researches of Captain 
Jenkins and Lieutenant Charlton, to be by far the most important (sic) and valuable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 India Revenue Consultations, Office of the Governor General of India, Calcutta, 12th May 1834, p. 16.  
58 India Revenue Consultations, 12th May 1834, p. 17. 
37	  
	  
that has ever been made on matters connected with the agricultural or commercial 
resources of this empire.59 
 
So, following the bureaucratic hierarchy, the tea committee gave the credit of 
discovering the tea bush to Jenkins and Charlton whereas the name of the Bruce brothers 
disappeared from the tea committee report. After two years of this confirmatory report, 
Captain Francis Jenkins came to know that the tea grown in the Brahmaputra valley was 
already a part of the commercial network with China. In 1836, a certain Shan Phookun 
reported to Captain Jenkins about the cultivation of tea in southwest of Nagaon District. 
The report, forwarded by Jenkins to Secretary of Government of India, stated that the tea 
grown in the Nowgong area was “very strong coarse and bitter in its wild taste. Its (sic) 
cultivated by the Pollang (subjects of Burmese King) race in these hills...The inhabitants 
cultivate it to a great extent as they have no other kind of cultivation and their livelihood 
chiefly depends on this.” Furthermore, it suggested that there was “a great demand for it 
as the Chinese merchants come and buy it up at 7/8 per mound in its moist state” and, it 
was “carried off by them on the backs of mules and bullocks. The average carried off 
yearly amounts to about 40000 mounds.”60 As these reports made the Company official at 
Calcutta more and more convinced about the tea bush being indigenous to the 
Brahmaputra valley, they changed their next course of action.  
As the Tea Committee no longer considered the China plan necessary, Gordon, 
who was still in China, was called back to India. Meanwhile, the results of Gordon’s 
efforts reached Calcutta in January 1835 in the form of a consignment of about 80,000 
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seeds of the China plant.61 Nathaniel Wallich undertook the task of germinating the seeds 
in Calcutta Botanical Garden and, “the resulting plants were distributed, 20,000 to 
Assam, 20,000 to Kumaon and the neighboring hill districts and 2,000 to the Madras 
Presidency.”62 But, the news received on these plants from different provinces was rather 
disappointing. Out of the 2,000 plants sent to the Madras Presidency, not more than 
twenty plants were alive when the consignment arrived there. In the Kumaon hills, 
approximately 1,325 surviving plants were replanted. The report that reached Wallich 
from Assam said that: “Thirty four small boxes and two large ones, besides 31 pots were 
left behind at Bishnath, as they contained altogether only 213 good plants, the reminder 
having perished or being in a doubtful state, which enabled Major White to discharge one 
of the boats.”63 In Assam, they put efforts to plant the surviving 8,000 seedlings. But, in 
another report coming in eighteen months later, an officer named William Griffiths said 
that, “having now sketched the fate of the nursery for Chinese plants” he was “naturally 
led to those of indigenous plants.”64 In a nutshell, the whole plan to import the China 
seeds was completely unsuccessful. Griffiths, however, in his report mentioned that C.A. 
Bruce’s experimental plantation, the independent venture at Sadiya, was a great success 
where indigenous plants were grown with the help of imported Chinese labor. In other 
words, the theory for successful tea plantation in Assam was formulated—indigenous 
plants cultivated by skilled Chinese labor. 
While the Company regime was making rapid developments in their plans towards 
tea cultivation in the region, Purandar Singha, the tributary Ahom king failed to deliver 
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on his promise. In 1838, the last Ahom Swargadeo failed to produce the revenue of Rs. 
50,000 as per the agreement. Subsequently, the Company regime brought eastern Assam 
under its direct administration. By 1838, the company officials also completed the land 
revenue assessments in both eastern and western Assam.65 In other words, all the 
necessary administrative steps to encourage capital investments in commercial tea 
plantations were successfully completed. Predictably, the response from the metropole 
was fast and affirmative. On 12th of February, 1839, a group of merchants got together at 
6 Great Winchester Street in London to discuss the prospects of investing capital on 
commercial tea plantations in Assam. These merchants immediately arrived on a 
consensus to invest in the tea plantations of Assam. The minutes of their first board 
meeting said:  
Chinese authorities have frequently suspended our trade, and ordered the 
“Barbarians” as Englishmen are still popularly and unofficially styled, to quit the 
country, a proceeding which has often occasioned considerable inconvenience and 
embarrassment. Every merchant who is engaged in the tea trade must feel that it is 
carried on in the most humiliating circumstances, and be desirous of getting rid of a 
dependence on the “Celestial Empire” by submission to which he is alone enabled to 
carry on a profitable trade in an article which was once a luxury, but has now 
become a necessary of living. An opportunity now for the first time presents itself to 
the English merchant to render himself and his country independent of China in 
trade in tea.66     
Incidentally this was the time when the tensions towards the first Opium War were 
gradually building up. The Chinese authorities increased vigilance on the supply of 
opium from British India. Within that context, the display of jingoism by the collective of 
British merchants was an obvious reaction. Their identification of the new site of tea 
production as a space within the British, and outside the “Celestial Empire” also reminds 
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us of Immanuel Wallerstein’s formulation on the relationship between the state and the 
expansion of capitalist world economy. Wallerstein had argued that, “a capitalist system 
requires a very special relationship between economic producers and the holders of 
political power.”67 Capitalists need to “circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor 
of states friendly to their interests.”68 Certainly, the merchants who congregated at 
Winchester Street internalized such dynamics of political power quite well. On 13th 
February, they met once again and, passed a resolution to form a joint stock company, 
“with a capital of £500,000 in 10,000 shares of £50 pounds each of which 8,000 were to 
be allotted in Great Britain and 2,000 in India.”69 They called the new joint stock 
company as Assam Company.  
However, during this time, a parallel development was under way in Calcutta. A 
group of Bengali businessman in collaboration with a few British traders formed a body 
called Bengal Tea Association. This business venture originated from the office of Carr, 
Tagore & Co. But, the Calcutta group’s ability to invest capital was nothing compared to 
that of Assam Company. Soon, Carr, Tagore & Co found out that they had no other 
option apart from merging their venture with the Assam Company. Speaking about the 
Calcutta collective, the official historian of the Assam Company wrote: “One would have 
thought that the Bengal Tea Association, having put in their application in India for 
Government’s properties earlier than the Assam Company, were in a stronger position to 
float their own concern, but perhaps the large Capital required for a commercial 
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undertaking was better raised in London.”70 The official historian of the Assam Company 
explained it in the simplest possible way. Within the nineteenth-century hierarchical 
structure of the global capitalist economy, the merger of Carr, Tagore & Company into 
the Assam Company was not accidental but inevitable. Significantly, the Assam 
Company’s new business venture in the Brahmaputra valley was also a moment of 
divergence in economic activity in the Eurasian landmass. Britain, who had depended on 
Chinese tea for centuries, was about to produce tea within the territorial limits of its own 
empire. Obviously, the Assam Company merchants could not imagine investing capital 
on such a long distance business venture without relying on the East India Company’s 
colonial state in India. In other words, it was the actions of the East India Company’s 
colonial state that maintained “the rules of the market” and, shaped the nature of the 
“local, regional and long distance trade” to eventually produce a divergence in the 
production and exchange chain of tea as a commodity in the Eurasian landmass.71 
As the process of capital investments in the Assam tea industry intensified, the East 
India Company administration framed land grant policies in the Brahmaputra valley by 
prioritizing the interests of the planters. In 1836, the government had set up a few 
experimental plantations in upper Assam. In 1840, two third of these plantations were 
transferred to the Assam Company. For the initial few years, the Assam Company was 
not liable to pay any rent to the government for these plantations. In 1838, the East India 
Company regime introduced the Wasteland Rules. The term wasteland was itself framed 
along the English utilitarian principles. Under the new rules, the land that was not 
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cultivated by the local peasants was labeled as wasteland. The Wasteland Rules also 
established the provisions for long-term lease of land. After these rules came into being, 
planters could apply for forty-five years’ lease on the condition that a quarter of the land 
must be used for plantation within the first five years of the lease. Furthermore, “No grant 
for agricultural purpose could be made for less than 100 acres at a time and to one who 
did not possess capital or stock worth at least Rs. 3 per acre.”72 In other words, it became 
extremely difficult for the local population to avail this opportunity. Only Europeans with 
capital could take the benefit of the new legal code.  
However, in spite of framing flexible land grant policies, the colonial state could 
not attract the European investors much. Apart from the Assam Company’s gradually 
expanding gardens, very few showed interest in investing money in the tea industry. As a 
result, in 1854, the officials at Fort William, Calcutta revised the land grant policies and 
increased the term of lease to ninety-nine years. Moreover, “minimum area of land for 
which one could apply was raised to 500 acres. Later the limit was reduced to 200 acres 
and made relaxable even to 100 acres in special case, if the native applicants could satisfy 
the collectors of their ability to bring” tenants from “outside of Assam.”73 In other words, 
founding the tea industry in Assam became a process of handing over the land of the 
region either to Europeans or to the new immigrants from other regions of India. So, 
unlike David Washbrook would like to believe, colonizing Assam was not the “logical 
outcome” of the region’s “own history of capitalistic development.” Nevertheless, the 
revision of land grant policies encouraged more Europeans to invest in the tea industry. 
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During early years of the tea industry, the Assam Company was the only group who 
invested heavily in the tea plantations. But, by 1859, there were total 51 tea estates under 
different proprietors. In that year, the Jorehaut Tea Company also began its operations. 
Between 1841 and 1859, the Assam Company alone expanded its gardens from 2311 
acres to 8,000 acres.74        
Parallel to these developments in the Brahmaputra valley, the colonial state also put 
its efforts to begin tea cultivation in the Barak valley. In 1856, Captain Francis Jenkins 
wrote to the officials at Fort William requesting for supply of tea seeds from Kumaon 
hills. Jenkins had received the information that, a certain Mr. Fortune had successfully 
managed to grow Chinese plants in the Kumaon hills. Jenkins was speculating about two 
possibilities. Firstly, he wanted to begin the tea plantations at Cacher. Secondly, he 
wanted to experiment with the Chinese variety and, see if green tea could be produced in 
the region. In his letter, Jenkins also informed that the number of people wanting to 
become tea planters in Assam was rapidly increasing and, he considered this as a good 
opportune moment to open a plantation at Cacher.75In fact, after the revision of the land 
grant policies, a good number of the East India Company officials gave up their jobs to 
become independent planters.76 Considering this development, the officials at Calcutta 
decided to pursue Jenkins’ plan. By 1857, seeds of Chinese Bohea tea were dispatched 
from Calcutta.  
However, there were some security concerns regarding the Cacher plan. The 
officials posted at Cacher considered it difficult to administer those “wild districts” and 
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therefore, they expressed doubts over opening a new government plantation in the area. 
Upon receiving these reports, the Calcutta officials suddenly changed their mind. They 
now suggested that, “a Government plantation is quite unnecessary for the 
encouragement of the cultivation of tea in Cacher.”77 However, they were quite open to 
the idea of encouraging private players. So such was the nature of the colonial policies of 
risk management. Handing over Cacher to private parties meant an escape from any 
accountability. Fortunately, the plan worked well for the colonial administration as much 
to their encouragement, “the cultivation of the tea plant in Cacher was extensively and 
vigorously prosecuted by numerous parties.” 78  The contract of beginning the tea 
plantation at Cacher eventually went to Mr. Williamson who already possessed two 
plantations in eastern Assam.79 Apart from this development at Cacher, the colonial state 
put concerted efforts towards opening a new plantation at the Chittagong Hills. By 1863, 
they completed the land assessments and, decided to hand over the area to the private 
players.80 So, by the mid 1860s, the tea industry in northeast India was flourishing. As a 
result, the colonial state’s frontier policy also changed with time. The East India 
Company’s vision of connecting the Brahmaputra valley to Yunnan via land appeared as 
inconsequential to the British Raj. Instead, the Raj gradually became unwilling to directly 
administer the hills between the Brahmaputra valley and the Irrawaddy valley. In 1873, 
the Government of India framed the Inner Line Policy and declared that the foothills were 
the limits of the British territory.  
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At the same time, it is worth noticing that the tea industry in southeastern sub-
Himalayan region took off solely on European capital. The new structure of tea 
production came into being without any significant appropriation of the pre-colonial local 
economic structures the region. Moreover, there was little participation of the indigenous 
population in the processes of founding the tea industry. During the early days of the tea 
industry, the local peasants of the Brahmaputra valley refused to work in the tea industry. 
Therefore, in order to push the peasants to work in the plantations, the colonial 
government designed stringent land revenue policies. 81  However, these coercive 
mechanisms failed. Due to abundance of land in the region, the peasants could 
continuously shift their base and escape the new taxation regime. Eventually, apart from 
a handful of Kacharis, the colonial officials could not succeed in bringing in the local 
peasants to the tea industry.82 Subsequently, in 1859, the colonial government introduced 
the indentured labor system through the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act XIII 1859. 
Soon, four hundred laborers were recruited from the areas of Benares, Ghazipur, 
Chotanagpur, and Bihar in northern India. In the years to follow, their numbers steadily 
increased and, by 1867-68, 22,800 indentured laborers migrated to the tea plantations of 
Assam. By 1901, their numbers increased to 645,000.83 In other words, the tea industry 
was founded in northeast India without any real participation of the people from the 
region. So the process of integration of northeast India into the global capitalist economy 
was quite different from rest of India. Unlike the village economy of southern India, there 
was clearly no “over-determined interactions among ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forces of 
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change” in northeast India. At the same time, there was no process of appropriation by 
the colonialists as the region was integrated into the global capitalist economy. The 
history of southeastern sub-Himalayan region plainly subscribes to the “chronicles of a 
capitalist world economy based on European imperial expansion.” 
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Chapter 5: A region in a Mobile world  
By 1840, southeastern sub-Himalayas became a major producer of an important 
global commodity. In other words, the region was integrated into the global capitalist 
economy through the production and exchange of tea. As British colonial capitalism 
restructured the economic activities in the region, a hitherto secluded region suddenly 
appeared on the global landscape of capital. The mobile capitalist world absorbed an 
isolated region into the orbit of its movement. As the frontier of the capitalist space 
moved forward, the geography and territoriality of southeastern sub-Himalayan region 
found new meanings. Northeast India’s appearance on the global stage through its 
inclusion into the British India reshaped the spatial location of the region. The region 
could now be identified differently with respect to its regional, imperial, and the global 
spatiality.  
Economically, northeast India entered into interdependent relationships of the 
global capitalist economy. As the tea industry in the region began to flourish, it started 
affecting the prices of the commodity in the London markets. By 1841, the Assam 
Company started exporting its produce. Tea, produced in Assam, was first brought to 
Calcutta before loading it to the ships heading towards London. On 7th December 1841, 
Helen Mary, the ship carrying the first consignment of Assam tea arrived in Britain. The 
first consignment containing 10,201lb finally came up for sale on 26th January 1842. The 
price range of the first lot was between 1s. 10d to 4s.3d per lb.84 At that time, the retail 
price of Chinese Bohea tea was over 3s per lb. So, the dealers and the grocers selling 
Assam tea could extract a wide margin of profit. The following year Assam Company’s 
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production increased considerably and, it reached almost 30,000 lb.85 However, the 
quantity of green tea produced in the Assam Company plantations was very insignificant 
and, they were in no position to compete with the Chinese exports. Green tea production 
was more labor intensive and the cost of production was 20 to 30 percent more than the 
black tea.86  
However, the black tea exported from Assam changed the consumption culture of 
the commodity in Britain. After the arrival of black tea from India, “working-class 
families were now able to afford tea as their main beverage.”87 Moreover, Black tea 
mixed with sugar became popular because of its nutritional value. To put it in the words 
of Sidney Mintz, the new habit of the working-class to drink tea became symbolic of the 
“national vigor” of a leading industrial nation.88 However, it was possible because of the 
increased supply and the gradually decreasing price of tea in the London markets. In 
1811, the average supply of tea in Britain was 1lb. 4oz. per head and, the average price 
was 6s. 8d. per pound. By 1821 the price went down to 5s 8d. and in 1831 it became 4s. 
6d. But, consumption per head remained almost the same as 1811. In 1841, the price per 
pound was 2d. lower than 1831 and the consumption per head increased to 1lb. 6oz. By 
1851, the average price had fallen down to 3s. 4.75d and, the consumption per head had 
increased to 2lb. 11oz. By 1861, the price had fallen down to 1s. 10.5d. the consumption 
per head increased to 3lb. 15oz. In 1861, the total quantity of tea that entered the British 
markets was 123, 000,000lb. In 1801, the average rate that the consumers paid per pound 
of tea was 1s. 2.5d. In 1811 the prices went up to 3s. 4d.. But, by 1821 it went down to 
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2s. 9.5d. and by 1831, the rate was 2s. 2.75d.. By 1841 it further went down 2s. 2.25d. 
The prices remained at the same level in 1851. In 1861, the average price was 2s.10.5d 
and, in 1871 it further went down to 1s.10.5d.89 In other words, increased supply of 
Indian tea and the continuously decreasing price of the commodity made tea-drinking a 
part of the dietary habits of the working-class Britons.  
Furthermore, as a result of the extension of tea plantations from 1856 onward, 
Britain not only became self-sufficient in tea production but it also started exporting the 
commodity to other regions of the world. It is worth mentioning that, by 1860, the British 
Raj in India successfully opened the Kumaon Hill tracts in the North Western Province 
and, the Niligiri hills in the Madras Presidency for commercial tea cultivation. The 1860s, 
witnessed a tremendous increase in the supply of Indian tea into the British market. In 
1866, it was reported that, “The Board of Trade returns show a remarkable increase in the 
quantity of tea entered for home consumption during the first five months” of that year. 
Simultaneously, in the 1860s, Britain started exporting tea to other world region. During 
the years 1864, 1865 and, 1866 Britain’s tea export were 13,000,000, 11,000,000 and 
10,000,000 pounds respectively.90 By 1890s, Britain was exporting large quantities of tea 
to Germany, the Baltic Provinces, and South America. 
As Britain’s tea industry in India became global, certain process of product 
customization also became a part of the marketing strategy. A description of London tea 
warehouse, published in 1890, suggested that packaging of tea was done to meet the local 
demands of the importing regions. Careful attention was paid while “packaging for the 
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voyage, and subsequent inland transit.” At the same time, “elegance of design and 
pictorial display”, “the wrappings and labels embellishing the packets and setting forth 
the attractive charms of the various judicious blends and mixings” were integral part of 
product customization.91 To put it differently, the scenes at the tea warehouses in London 
were representative of the newfound globality of the commodity. Most important, Britain, 
which was dependent on China tea till the beginning of the nineteenth century, could now 
export tea to different regions of the world due to its flourishing tea industry in India. To 
put it another way, southeastern sub-Himalayan region made its entry into the production 
and exchange chain of a global commodity through the British imperial connections.   
Furthermore, Britain’s tea industry in India transformed the state of affairs in the 
processes of tea production and distribution globally. In 1870, China’s total tea exports 
were 184,087, 000 lbs whereas the Indian exports were 13,046,000 lbs. However, this 
situation changed significantly by the end of the century. By 1900, China exported a total 
of 184, 530,000 lbs whereas the exports from India increased to 192,310,000 lbs. So, by 
the end of nineteenth century there was clearly some stagnancy in the Chinese tea exports 
while the exports from India increased exponentially. By 1920, the situation on the 
Chinese side deteriorated unimaginably. During this period China exported only 
40,846,000 lbs of tea while the Indian exports increased to 287, 525,000 lbs.92 Speaking 
about this development Robert Gardella observed that, “Within a generation (1870-1900), 
Chinese black tea had largely ceded their greatest foreign market—the United Kingdom 
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and the British dominions—to India and Ceylon.”93 From 1886 onward, British import of 
China tea gradually declined and, by 1896, it became almost negligible. In 1886, Britain 
imported 104,226,000 lbs of China tea whereas the import from India was 68,420,000 
lbs. However, by 1896, these figures changed dramatically to 19,800,000 lbs and 122, 
900,000 lbs respectively.94 As China tea lost its global market to Indian tea its effects 
began to show on the traditional tea growing regions of China.        
The Fujian province in China produced tea for the domestic market since the time 
of the Tang Dynasty. Tea exports from Fujian was commercially important before the 
Opium War and, it became even more so in the in the mid and late nineteenth centuries. 
In 1830, approximately 22,000,000 lbs of tea was exported to European market from 
northwest Fujian.95 However, by the turn of the nineteenth century, this tea-producing 
region entered into a crisis. Robert Gardella observed that the intensive production of 
cash crops for foreign markets negatively affected the peasants of Fujian over time. 
Although exports from the region grew steadily up to the 1880s, thereafter, high 
transaction costs negatively affected the producers. Moreover, the highly decentralized 
system required participants to continually negotiate and renegotiate deals. On top of that, 
the changing market conditions and the downward pressure on prices added troubles to 
the tea growers of Fujian.96 However, in contrast to the developments in Fujian, from the 
early 1880s, the Assam Company started exporting tea to the American and the 
Australian market. Between 1881 and 1890, production in the Assam Company gardens 
was consistent. During this period, the average production was over 2,000,000 lbs. 
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94 Gardella, Harvesting Mountains, p. 132. 
95 Gardella, Harvesting Mountains, p. 117. 
96 Gardella, Harvesting Mountains, p. 118-124.    
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Furthermore, in 1890, the Assam Company expanded its gardens and, added 1,689 acres 
of land to its possession.97 In other words, as the Assam Company was gradually growing 
from strength to strength the peasants in Fujian were heading towards a crisis.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion      
To cut the long story short, British colonial intrusion into southeastern sub-
Himalayan India was certainly not the “logical outcome” of the region’s “own history of 
capitalistic development.” In other words, David Washbrook, quite injudiciously 
generalized the story of northern and peninsular India to a broader geo-political region, 
which is identified as “South Asia.” However, I am not inclined to subscribe to the 
position of Immanuel Wallerstein either. Here, my objective was to rethink the history of 
northeast India’s integration into the global capitalist economy through the conceptual 
problem that the South Asianists and Wallerstein had collectively posed. The South 
Asianists’ disagreements with Wallerstein’s formulation of world system theory stand as 
an independent critique by its own merit. But, while establishing their position, these area 
studies specialists collectively share a sense of provinciality. Their shared sense of 
provinciality effectively obfuscates the practice of writing the connected histories of 
global capitalist economy. To explain the integration process of regions such as 
southeastern sub-Himalayan region, one must to do away with such a sense of 
provinciality. Of course, it is extremely important to make a distinction between the 
universal and the particular. But, the practice of privileging the particular must not 
become an exercise in seeing the spatial dynamics of global capitalism with respect to 
some provincial imagination. In fact, it is provincial imagination that reifies fuzzy 
historical constructions such “South Asia” as a geo-political region. I think, to pluralize 
the narratives of globalization of capital, it is useful to write the connected histories of a 
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